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~HAPTER 
2 The .Nature and Significance of Groups· 
Donelson R. Forsyth 
. 
Abstract 
An understanding of group counseling requires an understanding of groups themselves, their basic 
nature and processes. Given that human beings are a social species and spend their lives in groups 
rather than alone, an individual-level analysis of adjustment, well-being, and treatment, with its focus on 
internal, psychological processes, should be supplemented by a group-level analysis. The defining 
features of a group are relationships linking a substantial number of members, boundaries, 
interdependence, structure, cohesion, and entitatlvity (perceived groupness): and groups with .more of 
these features are more Influential than other forms of association, such as social networks. The 
chapter reviews a number of group-level processes that influence mem~ers' adjustment, including 
loneliness, ostracism, social support, socialization, social Identity, and performance, before 
recommending a synthesis of the individual- and group-level perspectives in a multilevel analysis of 
human development, adjustment, and potential. 
Keywords: lndlvldual-level analysis; group-level analysis; cohesion; entitativity; social networks; 
loneliness, ostracism, social support. 
People, no matter what they are doing-working, 
relaxing, studying. exercising, worshiping, playing, 
socializing, watching entertainment, or sleeping-
are usually in a group rather than alone. Some 
people seem to keep to themselves, but a preference 
tor solitude is considered unusual by most; sociality 
rs far more typical, for most people live out their 
lives in groups, around groups, and seeking out new 
groups. ffumans arc: so group-oricmc:d that at every 
turn we encounter groups. No one knows for cer· 
iain how many groups exist at th1s moment, but 
given the number of people on the planet and their 
proclivity to form groups, 30 billion is a conserva· 
tM: estimate. 
Groups are ubiquitous, not only in the context 
of day-to-day living but also in counseling settings. 
Group counseling, by definition, is an intervention 
that in some way infolves groups and group pro-
cesses. In schools counselors work with small groups 
of students as they deal with problems of devdop-
rnent, adjusrment, and achievement. Peers meet co 
offer each other suppon and wise counsel as they 
cope with problems they share in common. Hospital 
counselors meet with families to help them deal 
with the consequences of illness, disease, and death. 
Meneal health professionals in a range of settings 
work with people in groups to set new goals for 
adjusunent and help their clients learn the skills 
they need to connect with others. In communities 
social workers ~d organizers meet with residents to 
share information and identify solutions to commu· 
nal issues. Consultants and trainers in organizations 
teach clients the skills they need to sec realistic goals 
and to identify the steps they muse take to reach 
them. Even when working with single individuals, 
the influence of groups cannot be ignored, for in 
many cases individuals' difficulties and satisf.a.ctions 
are intimately linked to groups: those to which they 
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belong, those that they are seeking to join, those 
that exclude them, and even those that reject and 
denigrate them. 
This chapter is based on a single assumption: To 
understand group counseling-and, more generally, 
to understand people-one must understand groups 
themselves, their basic nature and processes. All too 
often a group-level explanation of people's thoughts, 
emotions, and actions is overlooked in the search 
for an explanation of the causes of dysfunction and 
adjustment, just as a group approach to treatment is 
viewed as a second-best choice compared to an indi-
vidualistic intervention. A truly multilevel approach, 
however, requires the integration of many levels of 
analysis in the development of a comprehensive 
theory of human adjustment and treatment. The 
chapters in this handbook stress the group rather 
than the individual not because the group level is 
viewed as more important than the individual but 
rather because the individual level has received 
favorable treatment for so long that an analysis that 
takes into account group-level processes is overdue. 
This chapter examines three related questions. 
First, what does the analy'sis of groups and their 
dynamics contribute to an overall understanding of 
human behavior? For those who, by tradition, adopt 
an individual-centered approach to understanding 
individuals' thoughts, actions, and emotions, what 
does a multilevel perspective that recognizes that 
individuals arc also members of larger social units 
offer? Second, what are the unique charaeteristics of 
groups that provide the foundation for their psycho-
logical and interpersonal significance? From small, 
problem-focused, and highly structured psychoedu-
cational groups co large and geqgrn.phically scattered 
community groups. groups come in a staggering 
~nment of shapes and sizes. What qualities do 
these various groups have in common, and what dis-
tinguishes them from other social aggregations, such 
as netw0~ks of associations and communities? Third, 
what is the conncaion bcrween the individual and 
the group? If individuals arc not isolates but rather 
more frequently mcmben of groups, in what ways do 
these groups influence the individual members, and 
how do the members in turn influence their groups? 
'The Reality of Groups 
Emile Durkheim (1897/1966), at the end of the 
nineteenth century, presented evidence that sug-
gested that suicide results more from interpersonal 
causes than intrapsychic ones. People did not take 
their own lives, he maintained, because of psycho-
logical maladjustment or delusion but rather when 
the groups that they belonged to no longer provided 
them with reliable alliances with others or regulative 
support systems. He maintained that groups pro-
vide a buffer against the stresses of daily life events, 
and as a result, those who were closely associated 
with traditional integrative groups enjoyed greater 
happiness and health Qoiner, Brown, & Wingate, 
2005; c£ Kushner & Sterk, 2005). 
Many scholars of that period agreed with 
Durkheim's idea that groups profoundly influ-
ence their members (e.g., Le Bon, 1895/1960; 
McDougall, 1908). Others, however, took a differ-
ent position. Allport (1924), for example, ques-
tioned the need to look beyond psychological 
processes when explaining why people acted as they 
did. Groups, according to Allport, were not even 
real; and he felt that the behavior of individuals in 
groups could be understood by studying the psy-
chology of the group members since "the actions of 
all are nothing more than the sum of the actions of 
each taken separately .. (p. 5). He is reputed to have 
said lfyou can't trip over a group" (Pepitone, 1981). 
Vestiges of Allport's skepcicism continue to 
influence theorists' and researchers' willingness to 
consider group-level concepts when explaining mal-
adaptive and adaptive processes. Although most, in 
principle, admit.that groups are influential, in prac-
tice when they search for the causes of behavior and 
when they make choices about the best way to solve 
personal and interpersonal problems, they adopt an 
individual-centered perspective rather than a group-
ccntered one. This section examines the sources and 
the ramifications of the tendency to think individ-
ual first and group second, in theory, research, and 
practice. 
Perceiving /ntlivUluals and Groups 
The well-known face-vase visual illusion can be 
construed as depicdng either a vase or the faces of 
two individuals looking at each other. Illustrating 
the figure-ground Gestalt principle of perception, 
when people report seeing a vase, the image of the 
vase becomes the figure and the individuals become 
the ground. Conversely, when people report seeing 
N{O individuals looking at each otjler, the fuces 
become figure and the vase retreats into the back-
ground. The image hides a third image however: 
two-person group, whose members are facing one 
another. Yee, the group is rarely noticed. 
In terms of Gestalt principles of perceptions, 
groups are the ground, whereas individuals are the 
figure. The most famous paiµting in the world 
depicts a single individual. The number of words in 
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languages that can be used to describe individuals 
and their personality chatacteristics is substantial-
Norman (1963), for example, identified 2,800 trait-
descriptive adjectives in his study of personality-
but how many words describe qualities that arc 
specific to groups? Groups arc not generally 
described as jolly, brave, playful, assertive, nosey, 
sensual, cool, reasonable, or stingy; but individuals 
arc. Concepts that are used to describe qualities of 
individuals, such as personality, needs, intelligence, 
and self, have made their way easily into everyday 
language; but concepts that were developed to 
describe aspects of groups-for example, Cattcll's 
(1948) syntality, Bogardus's (1954) groupality, and 
Moreno's (1934) sociometry-rarely find popular 
acceptance. Even though people speak of such con-
cepts as teamwork, leadership, and cliques in their 
discussions of c.ontcmpociry issues, they tend co 
translate these group-level processes into individual-
istic ones. The key ingredient for teamwork, they 
-suggest, is having a particular type of personality 
that stresses cooperation and communicatioh. 
Leadership continues to be viewed as a personality 
trait, rather than a process that emerges during 
cooperative interactions. Cliques, and their negative 
tendencies, are attributed to the motives of the 
clique members, rather than group-level processes. 
Indi"iduals, when considering the causes of 
their own and ochers' behavior; are less likely to 
favor an explanation that stresses group-level causes 
tc:lative to one that stresses such psychological, 
individualistic causes as motivations, emotions, 
intentions, and personality. The well-documented 
fundamental attribution error occurs because per-
ceivers arc more likely to attribute a person's actions 
to personal, individual qualities rather than exter-
nal, situational forces (Ross, 1977). Evidence sug-
gests that social perception starts with an assumption 
of dispositionality; the attributor initially catego-
rizes the behavior as one that reflects a particular 
trait or quality and then uses this behavioral label to 
characterize the actor. Only then, and only if he or 
she has the cognitive resources and motivation to 
process fully information about the situation, docs 
the perceiver consider group-level causes (Gilbert, 
1998). Hence, even when individuals engage in 
unusual behaviors in response to an extreme degree 
of group pressure, perceivers believe that actions 
reflect qualities of the person rather than the group 
(Nolan, Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2008). Perceivers also expect that individuals will 
behave similarly in all groups to which they belong; 
after all, if personal, individualistic qualities are the 
primary causes of behavior, then group-level process 
should play only a minor role in determining out-
comes (Darley, 1992). 
This tendency to see individuals first and groups 
second may vary from one culture to another. 
Western countries such as the United States and 
Great Britain lean toward individualism: the equal-
ity of separate individuals and the rights of the indi-
vidual over the group. Individuals are the center of 
such societies, and their rights to private property, 
to express themselves, and to engage in actions for 
their own personal gain are protected and even 
encouraged. Many non-Western societies, in con-
trast, stress collectivism. Individuals in such societ-
ies think of themselves as group members first and 
individuals second and, thus, emphasize the unity 
of all people in cheir group rather than each person's 
individuality. Social existence is centered on group 
relations, for it is the group that creates social obli-
gations based on respect, crust, and a sense of com-
munity (friandis & Suh, 2002). 
Because of these varying priorities, people raised 
in individualistic cultures differ in many ways from 
people raised in cultures that are based on collectiv-
ism. To speak in general terms (for people vary con-
siderably within any given culture), individuals in 
Asian, western European, African, and Middle 
Eastern countries tend to be more loyal to thc:ir 
group and more suspicious of individuals who do 
not bdong to their group. Collectivistic culrures 
also tend to be more hierarchical in organization, 
and they stress conformity and obedience co author-
ity. Individuals' self-concepts also differ in individu-
alistic and collectivistic contexts, with greater 
emphasis on personal identity in the former and 
greater emphasis on social identity (e.g., roles, mem-
bership, rdations) in the latter. Triandis and his col-
leagues illustrated this difference by asking people 
from various countries co describe themselves. As 
they expected, these self-descriptions contained 
more references to social identities-membership in 
groups, roles in society, ethnicity-when people 
were from collectivistic countries (e.g., Japan, 
China). They discovered that some individuals from 
the People's Republic of China described themselves 
exclusively in interpersonal terms, whereas some US 
resident.S used only personal descriptors: They had 
no elements of a group-level identity (Triandis, 
McCusker, & Hui, 1990). 
Levels of Analym 
Researchers, theorists, and practitioners, whether 
they are psychologists, social workers, consultants, 
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counselors, or clinicians, accept as givens some core 
assumptions about humans and their basic nature. 
These guiding assumptions, far from being biases, 
are instead useful heuristics, for they provide the 
means of dealing with the countless alternative and 
correct interpretations of the evidence and issues 
that they must confront and interpret in their work. 
Coan (1968), Rosenberg and Gara (1983), and 
Watson (1967) present a sampling of the divergent 
asswnptions that have characterized various 
approaches in psychology since the field's inception. 
Arc unconscious processes influential determinants 
of behavior, or are actions primarily the result of 
reinforcement mechanisms? Is behavior caused by 
forces present in the immediate external environ-
ment or historical factors whose force is still felt in 
the distant future? Can psychological processes be 
broken down into specific elements, or is a holistic 
approach that avoids analysis more informative? 
Watson (1967) suggested that these "prescriptions" 
serve to orient researchers, theorists, and practitio-
ners when they conceptualize problems and search 
for solutions. 
THB INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
One of the most endurin,g prescriptions within the 
field of psychology is psychogenicism: the focus on 
the internal, psychological determinants of bchav-
io!. With behaviorists providing a notable exception, 
the theorists who provided the foundations for con-
temporary psychology offered models that included 
reference to the strucrurc of personality. dynamic 
intrapsycl\ic mechanisms, and the relationships 
between the individual's particular qualities and his 
or her behavior. Adler, Freud, Jung, Horney, Maslow, 
Murray, and others were generalists; but at the core 
their theories assumed that personality, needs, moti-
vations, and other psychogenic mechanisms play a 
pivotal role in adjustment and dysfunction. The psy-
chogenic orientation was summarized by Urban 
(1983, p. 163), who argued strongly that when psy-
chologists look for causes outside of the individual 
they" deny and distort the essential quality of human 
existence. Everything of significance with regard to 
this entire process occurs within the inner or subjec-
tive experience of the individual." Psychogenicism is 
also compatible with general mdogmism, in which 
behaviors arc attributed to a host of internal pro-
cesses such as genetic factors, past events, and bio-
logical processes. Psychogenic approaches assume 
that psychological states mediate the relationship 
between the external world and the person's reaction 
to it (Forsyth & Leary, 1991). 
THE GROUP-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
The individual-level approach suggested by psycho-
genicism contrasts with a group-level approach. 
'This orientation assumes that if one wishes to under-
stand individuals, one roust understand groups. As 
a highly social species, humans arc rarely separated 
from contact and interaction with other humans, 
and in most cases these connections occur in a group 
context. In co~equence, groups and their processes 
have a profound impaet on individuals; they shape 
actions, thoughts, and feelings. Although people 
often consider their cognitive ruminations, includ-
ing thoughts, decisions, attitudes, and values, to be 
private and personal, these are shaped by the groups 
to which they belong. Sherif (1936) and Asch 
(1957). in early demonstrations of the impact of a 
group on members' mast basic judgments, discov-
ered that people will base their decisions on the 
statements made by other group members rather 
the evidence of their own senses. Groups prompt 
their members to endorse certain ideas and atti-
tudes, and even nonconformists will eventually rake 
on the standards of the groups to which they belong 
(Newcomb, 1943). People also process information 
eollectively, through discussion and other group 
communication processes, so such basic cognitive 
processes as planning, evaluating, judging, de~ision 
malcing, and problem solving are made, not by indi~ 
viduals, but by groups (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). 
Groups also influence members' emotions, in 
both direct and indirect ways. As Schachter and 
Singer's (1962) classic study of how people label their 
physiological states indicates, people often rdy on 
cues in the group setting to decide if they are happy. 
sad, angry, or frightened., Emotions are also some-
times contagious in groups, with the feelings of one 
individual passing rapidly from one member of the 
group to the next (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). 
Crowds and mobs, for example, often experience 
waves of strong emotions, to the point that external 
observers often fed that such gro~ps act as if they 
possess a shared, or collective, conscious. Even mem-
bers of more commonplace and highly structured 
groups, such as work groups and sports teams, 
become more and more similar in their overall mood 
the longer they remain together (Kelly, 2004). 
Groups also influence members' actions and 
reaaions. As Durkheim concluded, people respond 
very differently when they are isolated rather than 
integrated in a group, and this shift has been docu-
mented time and again in studies of a wide variety 
of behaviors in many different situations. Young 
children imitate the way their playmates dress, talk, 
2.2. THE NATURB AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GROUPS 
and ace (Adler, Kless, & Adler, 1992). Older chil-
dren's actions are guided by their family's influence, 
until by adolescence the peer group becomes the 
primary determiner of behaviors (Harris, 1995). 
Groups can, in some cases, change people's behavior 
so dramatically that their behavior in a group bears 
po relationship to their behavior when isolated. The 
early group psychologists may have exaggerated the 
apparent madness of people when immersed in large 
crowds, but contemporary researchers have con-
firmed the discontinuity effect: In many cases the 
actions of individuals when in groups cannot be 
predicted by studying the qualities and actions of 
ea~ individual group member (Wlldschut, Pinter, 
Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). 
A group-level approach also assumes that infor-
mation will be lost, or at least overlooked, if the 
focus is solely on individuals rather chan the larger 
social wtlt since groups possess characteristics "that 
cannot be reduced to or described as qualities of itS 
participants" (Sanddands & St. Clair, 1993, p. 443). 
A group's cohesiveness, for example, is more than the 
mere attraction of each individual member for one 
another (Hogg, 1992). Individuals may not like each 
other on a personal level, yet when they form a group 
they experience powerful feelings of unity and esprit 
de .corps. As Lcwin's (1951) Gestalt orientation 
argued that a group is greater than the sum of its 
parts, so it cannot be understood through piecemeal, 
individual-only, analysis. 
THE MUITILEVEL PERSPECTIVE 
Theorists, researchers, and practitioners offer a range 
of solutions to problems of human adjustment and 
dysfunction. Some highlight aspects of the individ-
ual: their personalities, motivation, emotions, and 
perceptions. Others focus on interpersonal factors, 
such as relations with friends and relatives and group 
memberships. Some stress the larger social context 
by suggesting that the most important factors to 
COP._sidcr arc cultural ones. These perspectives arc 
often. viewed as mutually exclusive views that resist 
integration. As Sarason (1981, p. 175) explained, 
"built into psychology, pan of its world view, is the 
polarity man and society. Call it a polarity or a 
dichotomy or even a distinction, it makes it easy for 
psychology to focus on one and ignore the other." 
A multilevel perspective, in contrast, does not 
favor a specific level of analysis when examining 
quman behavior, for it argues for examining pro-
cesses that range along the micro-meso-macro con-
tinuum. Asked why an individual acts altruistically, 
acts in ways that create conflict with others, or 
engages in aberrant actions, a multilevel approach 
docs not stop at the micro level by considering only 
the qualities, characteristics, and actions of the indi-
vidual members. A multilevel approach also consid-
ers mcso-level group processes, including group 
influence, cohesion, composition, and structure. 
The approach also considers macro-level factors, 
which are the qualities and processes of the larger 
collectives chat enfold the groups, such as commu-
nities, organizations, or societies. Groups, then, are 
nested at the mcso level where the bottom-up 
micro-level variables meet the cop-down m~~o­
lcvel variables (Forsyth, 2010). 
A multilevel approach has several advantages to 
a one-level-only analysis of human behavior. An 
individual-level analysis stresses the causal impor-
tance of the individual's past and future and best 
deals with situational factors by filtering them 
through individual-level mechanisms. Because 
personality, experience, attitudes, and values must 
be represented within the individual, a group-level-
only analysis tends to ignore chem, choosing instead 
to focus on contemporaneous causes present in 
the immediate setting. The result is a model chat 
suggests people are mechanistic, static, and pur· 
poseless, whereas they are, in reality, motivated, 
goal-seeking, and dynamic. A multilevel approach 
is more theoretically egalitarian, recognizing the 
causal influence of factors that range along the 
individual-group-organization continuum. 
The Nature of Groups 
A group-level analysis argues that groups influence 
their members' adjustment and mental health, but 
the magnitude of this impact depends on the nature 
of the group. Groups. unlike individuals, are noc all 
created equal. Some aggregations of individuals 
seem, intuitively, to deserve to be called "groups": 
Families, gangs, suppon groups, school boards, pro-
duction teams, and neighborhood associations arc 
examples. Other collections of people-bystanders 
to a mugging, the audience in a theater, or Internet 
users arguing with one another via commentaries to 
a blogger's post-may lack the defining features of a 
group. But what are chose defining features? 
R~'4tiomhip1 
Definitions of the concept of group abound, but 
most theorists would agree that a group comes into 
existence when people become connected by and 
within social relationships. Both Lewin (1948) and 
Cartwright and Zander (1968) stressed the impor-
tance of relationships among members as the key 
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defining feature of a true group, with Cartwright 
and Zander (1968, p. 46) concluding a "group is a 
collection of individuals who have relations to one 
another that make them interdependent to some 
significant degree." 
Groups create and sustain relationships between 
individual members, but the relationships that link 
che members of a group together are not of one type. 
In families, for example. the relationships ace based 
on kinship, but in the workplace the relationships 
are based on taslNelated interdependencies. In some 
groups members are friends of one another, bur in 
others the members express little mutual attraction, 
liking, or loving for one another. Nor are the rela-
tionships linking members of different types of 
groups equally strong or enduring. Some relation-
ships, like the links between members of a family or 
a clique of close friends, are enduring ones, which 
have developed over time and are based on a long 
history of mutual influence and exchange. In other 
cases, however, the ties between members may be 
relatively weak ones rhat arc so fragile they are easily 
severed. Nor need all relationships be mutual ones. 
In a group of friends, for example, some members 
may be liked by all the group members but these 
group members may like only a subset of the group 
members in return. But no matter what the nature of 
the relations, a group exists when individuals are 
connected to one another by some type of social tie. 
Theoretically, the number of relationships 
needed to create a completely interconnected 
group-one where every member is linked to every 
other member-is given by the equation n(n- 1)/2, 
where n is the number of people in group (and if 
we assume that all relationships arc mutual). A rela-
tively small group-for example, a 12-pcrson jury 
or committee--would require the development 
and maintenance of 66 relationships if every 
member was connected to every other member. In 
consequence, in many cases the number of ties in a 
group is less than the number of potential relation-
ships. Evolutionary theorist Dunbar (2008) goes so 
far as to suggest that the need to track connections 
with others--to remember who can be trusted to 
share. who will act in helpful ways, or who is owed a 
favor and who is not-spurred the development of a 
larger brain in primates. Dunbar's social brain 
hypothesis assumes that group life is more psycho· 
logically demanding than a more isolated, inde· 
pendent one. Moreover, given the number of 
relationships that must be tracked in larger groups, 
Dunbar suggests thar humans likely evolved to live 
most comfortably in groups of 150 people or fewer. 
In general, the stronger the relationships linking 
members, the more influence the group has on irs 
members. A young man who is part of a gang. for 
example, may act in ways that the group requires 
because the relationships that bind him to the group 
are so numerous and so strong that the group is too 
powerful to resist. In contrast, a member of a club 
may break the group's attendance rules regularly 
because there are few ties that bind him or her to the 
group or those ties are relatively weak. As with other 
relationships, such as friendships and partnerships, 
the strength of the relationship is determined, in 
large part, by the rewards the group provides, the 
costs the rdationship incurs, and the member's 
degree of commitment to the group ('Thibaut & 
Kelly, 1959). 
Boundaries 
The rdationships that sustain a group not only link 
members to one another but also define who is in the 
group and who is not. A group is therefore boundar~ 
ied, in a psychological sense, with those who are 
included in the group recognized as members and 
those who are not part of the group excluded as non-
members. These boundaries set the members apart 
from other people, and hence, they distinguish a 
group from another psychologically significant aggre-
gate: the social network. To become part of a soda/ 
network, an individual need only establish a relation-
ship of some son with a person who is already part of 
the network. If persons A and B already know each 
other-they are linked by a social relationship-th.en 
person C can join their network by establishing a 
relationship with either A or B. But a group, unlike a 
network, is more than a chain of individuals joined 
in dyadic pairings. Even though A and B are friends 
and B and C are friends, if these individuals are 
linked only in these dyadic pair-bonds, then they are 
part of a social network but not a group. A group 
exists when members form a relationship with the 
group as a whole and when it is the group that sus· 
tains, at least in part, the relationships among each of 
the individual members. If A. B, and Care not linked 
to a supervening aggregate, then they arc jUst sets of 
friends and not members of a group. 
Groups' boundaries vary from the stable and 
relatively formalized to the unstable and highly per-
meable. As Ziller's (1965) theory of open and closed 
groups suggests that group membership can flucru-
are for various reasons: members are voted out of 
the group (e.g., governing committees), members 
voluntarily come and go (e.g., community service 
groups), and so on. Regardless of the reasons for 
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group fluctuation, open groups arc especially 
unlikely to reach a state of equilibrium since mcm-
b.ers recognize that they may lose or relinquish their 
place within the group at any time. Members of 
such groups, especially those in which membership 
is dependent on voting or meeting a panicular stan· 
dard, arc more likely to monitor the actions of 
od)ers. Ziller writes, "In the expandccj. frame of ref-
erence of the open groups in which transfers fre-
quently occur, more accurate and more reliable 
ratings of the members are possible" (1965, p. 168). 
In contrast, closed-groups a{e often more cohesive as 
competition for membership is irrelevant and group 
m'embers anticipate future collaborations. Thus, in 
closed groups, individuals are more likely to focus 
on the collective narure of the group and to identify 
with the group. Zillcr's theory suggests that open 
gf9ups, by their very nature, are less cohesive. 
Interdependence 
Groqps entwine the fates of their members. As 
Ca;twright and Zander (1968, p. 46) noted, it is 
not just that the members are tclated to each other 
but that these relationships "make them interdepen-
dent to some significant degree." Shaw (1981, 
p.i454), in his definition, concluded that a group is 
"two or more persons who are interaccing with one 
another in such a manner that eadi. person in£lu-
enccs and is influenced by each other person." When 
individuals are interdependent, their outcomes, 
actions, thoughts, feelings, and experiences are 
determined in part by others in the group. 
Some groups create only the potential for inter-
dependence among members. The people standing 
ina·queue at the checkout counter in a store, audi-
ence members in a darkened. theater, or the congre-
gation of a large mega-church are only minimally 
interdependent; but other groups-such as gangs, 
families, spons teams, and military squads-create 
fa~ higher levels of interdependency since members 
reliably and substantially influence one anothds 
outcomes over a long period of time and in a variety 
of situations. In such groups the influence of one 
member on another also tends to be mutual; 
member A can influence B, but B can also influence 
A in return. In other groups, in contrast, influence 
is more unequal and more one-directional. In a 
business, for example, the boss may determine how 
employees spend their time, what kind of rewards 
they experience, and even the duration of their 
membership in the group. These employees can 
influence their boss to a degree, but the boss's 
influence is nearly unilateral. 
Interdependence increases the degree of power 
the group holds over each member, for the greater 
the members' dependence on the group, the more 
likely they arc to act in ways that will sustain their 
membership-even if that means engaging in 
behaviors that they find personally objectionable. 
As social exchange theory explains, the greater the 
individual members' commitment to the group--
with commitment generally increasing with time 
spent in ~he group, the costs already incurred by 
membership, the level of rewards received from the 
group, and the lack of alternative group mcmber-
ships--the greater rhe group's power. 
Structure 
Moreno (1934), in his analysis of the nature of 
groups and their durability, argued that the psycho-
logical impact of a group on its members depends in 
large part on the group's structural integrity. He 
believed char groups with harmonious attraction 
and authority relations among members were likely 
to survive and that the individuals in such groups 
would be more likely to prosper psychologically. 
Groups are structured, rather than unstructured, 
when roles, norms, and patterned relations organize 
the actions and activities within them. Sherif and 
Sherif (1956, p. 144), suggest that these structwal 
features are what differentiate a group from a hap-
hazard assortment of individuals: "A group is a social 
unit which consists of a number of individuals who 
stand in (more or less) definite status and role rela-
tionships to one another and which possesses a set 
of values or norms ofirs own regulating the behav-
ior of individual members." 
The more structured the group, the more clearly 
defined the aetions taken by specific members. 
Many groups are structured by design, for by defin-
ing roles, norms, and relations the group and its 
founders hope to facilitate goal attainment. But 
even without a deliberate attempt at organizing, the 
group will probably develop a structure anyway. 
Initially, members may consider themselves to be 
just members, basically similar to each other. But 
over time each group member will tend to perform 
a specific range of actions and interact with other 
group members in a particular way. The role of 
leader emerges in many groups, but other roles .arise 
in groups over time. Benne and Sheats (1948), in 
one of the earliest analyses of the roles that members 
take in groups, concluded that a group, to survive, 
must meet two basic demands: it must accomplish 
its tasks and the relationships among its members 
must be maintained. They suggested that the roles 
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that frequently emerge in groups match these two 
basic needs, with task roles including coordlnator, 
claborator, energizer, evaluator-critic, information-
giver, information-seeker, and opinion-giver and 
the relational, sodoemotional roles including com-
promiser, encourager, follower, and harmonizer. 
Benne and Sheats also identified a third set of roles: 
the individualistic roles occupied by individuals 
who stress their own needs over the group's needs. 
Norms are the consensual and often implicit 
standard that describe what behaviors should and 
should not be performed in a given group context 
and are part of the group's socially shared structure. 
Although agreement among members is often 
implicit and taken for granted, only when a degree 
of consensus emerges regarding a standard does it 
functi6n as a norm. SheriPs (1936) seminal work 
confirmed the interpersonal, group-level status of 
norms by experimentally creating norms in a labo-
ratory setting. The norms his groups generated had 
a reality independent of the individual members 
who supported them so that when new members 
joined the groups they learned, and subsequently 
passed on, the standards that they themselves had 
acquired through group interaction. 
Roles, norms, and other structural aspects of 
groups, although unseen and often unnoticed, lie 
at the heart of their most dynamic processes. 
Individuals who occupy roles that grant them more 
status within the group tend to be more influential, 
even when examining issues that fall outside their 
areas of expertise. When several members form a 
subgroup within the larger group, they exert 
more influence on the rest of the group than they 
would individually. When people manage to place 
themselves at the hub of the group's information-
cxchange patterns, their influence over others 
increases. As Mordand and Levine (1982) explain 
in their theory of group socialization, when people 
join a group, they initially spend much of their time 
trying to come to terms with the structural require-
ments of their group. If they cannot meet the group's 
demands, they might not remain a member for 
long. As their commitment to the group increases 
and the group becomes increasingly committed to 
the individual, individuals transition into the role of 
full member and tend to fulfill the requirements of 
their position within the group. 
Cohelion 
A group is not just the individuals who are members 
or even the dyadic pair-bonds that link members to 
one another. A group, viewed holistically, is a unified 
whole; an entity formed when interpersonal forces 
bind the members together in a single unit with 
boundaries that mark who is in the group and who 
is outside of it. 1his quality of ''groupness," solidar-
ity, or unity is generally termed cohesion and is a nec-
c5sary, if not sufficient, condition for a group to 
exist. A group without cohesion would disintegrate 
since forces that keep the group intact are insuffi-
cient to counteract the forces that pull the group 
apart (Dion, 2000). 
Durkheim (189711966, 190011973) discussed 
how groups vary in terms of cohesiveness; he pro-
posed that groups with greater solidarity had more 
influence over their members. A more formal analy-
sis of cohesion was supplied by Lewin (1948), who 
suggested that cohesion involved both individual-
levd and group-level processes. At the individual 
level, cohesiveness derives from each member's 
attraction to other group members, whether this 
attraction is based on liking, respect, or trust. At the 
group level, cohesiveness reflects that "we-feeling" 
that joins people together to form a single unit 
(Cartwright, 1968; Festingcr, 1950). Many factors 
combine to determine a group's level of cohesive-
ness, including attraction among members, similar-
ity of members to one another, group size, and 
structural features such as the absence of subgroups, 
a flatter status structure, and so on. 
Cohesion is a uniquely group-level concept, for 
cohesion comes about if, and only if, a group exists. 
Although a group with low levels of cohesiveness 
may be a durable one, cohesiveness usually signals 
the health of the group. A cohesive group will be 
more likely to prosper, over time, since it retains its 
members and allows them to reach goals that would 
elude a more incoherent aggregate. The group that 
lacks cohesion is at risk, for if too many members 
drift away, the group may not survive. The concept 
of cohesiveness, too, offers insights into some of the 
most intriguing questions people ask about groups: 
Why do some groups fail to retain their members, 
whereas others grow rapidly in size? Why do some 
groups stand loyally behind the decisions of their 
leaders, whereas the members of other groups dis-
sociate themselves from their group at the first sign 
of conflict? When do members put the needs of 
their group above their own personal interests? 
What is the source of the feeling of confidence and 
unity that arises in some groups and not in others? 
If one understands the causes and consequences of 
cohesion, then one is further along in understand-
ing a host of core processes that occur in groups, 
including productivity, members' satisfaction and 
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turnover, morale, formation, stability, influence, 
and conflict. 
Entittztivity (Groupne11) 
Groups are real not just in a physical sense but also 
in a perceprual sense. Groups arc often construed to 
be unified Gestalts whose parts mix together to 
form a single thing by members and nonmembers. 
Perceivers readily hypostasize groups: They perceive 
them to be real and assume that their properties arc 
influential ones. Brown (2000, p. 3) considered this 
aspect of a group-that members define the group 
as real and see themselves as members of it-to be 
the sine qua non of a group. He writes: "A group 
exists when two or more people define themselves as 
members of it and when its existence is recognized 
by at least one other." Turner, Hogg. Oakes, Reicher, 
and Wetherell (1987, pp. 1-2) similarly suggested 
"a psychological group is defined as one that is psy-
chologically significant for the members, to which 
tliey relate themselves subjectively fur social com-
p·arison and the acquisition of norms and values ... 
that they privately accept membership in, and which 
influences their attitudes and behavior." 
Campbell (1958) believed that this aspect of a 
group was so essential to understanding how people 
perceive groups that he coined the word mtitativity 
to describe a group's perceived unity. Entitativity, 
as perceived cohesiveness, depends on certain per-
ceptual cues that perceivers rely on intuitively to 
decide if an aggregation of individuals is a true 
group or just a collection of people. Many aggre-
giltes of individuals occupying the same physical 
location--commuters waiting for a bus or specta· 
tors at a sporting event-may lack entitativicy since 
they seem to be a disorganized mass of individuals 
who happen to be in the same place at the same 
time, but if they begin to cheer, express similar 
emotions, and move together, they may look more 
like a group to those who are observing them. 
Entitativity, according to Campbell, is substan· 
tially influenced by degree of interdependence 
(common fate: Do the individuals experience the 
same or interrelated outcomes?), homogeneity 
(similarity: Do the individuals perform similar 
beh"aviors or resemble one another?), and presence 
(proximity: How close together are the individuals 
in the aggregation?). 
Calling an aggregation a "group" is not mere 
labeling. Groups that are high in entitativity tend to 
be inoi:e cohesive (Zyphur & Islam, 2006), and 
their members also experience enhanced feelings of 
social well-being (Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008). 
When people believe they are part of a highly enti-
tative group, they are more likely to respond to the 
group's normative pressures (Castano, Yzcrbyl, & 
Bourguignon, 2003); and this tendency is particu-
larly suong when people feel uncertain about them-
selves and the correctness of their beliefs (Hogg, 
Sherman, Diersclhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007). 
The concept of entirativity also helps to explain the 
varied reactions people display when they are part of 
groups that arc created using technology, such as 
conference calls or Internet-mediated connections. 
Some members do not consider such groups to be 
very entitacive because they lack physical presence, 
but others report that such groups are as high in 
entitativity as any face-to-face group to which they 
belong (Lowry, Roberts, Romano, Cheney, & 
Hightower, 2006). Entitatlvity, then, is often in the 
eye of the beholder. As Zander and his colleagues 
demonstrated many years ago, simply telling a col-
lection of people they constitute a group is sufficient 
to uigger intragroup dynamics. When they repeat-
edly told women working in isolation that they were 
nonetheless members of a group, the women 
accepted this label and lacer rated themselves more 
negatively after their "group" failed (Zander, 
Scotland, & Wolfe, 1960). 
Entirativity also influen~ nonmembers' percep-
tions of ..the group and its members. Perceivers are 
more likely to stereotype specific individuals when 
they are members of a group that is thought to be 
high in enticativity (Rydell, Hugenbcrg. Ray, & 
Mackie, 2007). Observers arc more likely to assume 
the members of such groups are highly similar to one 
another (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002) 
but different in significant ways from nonmembers 
(Pickett, 2001). Their perceptions of such groups 
also reveal a tendency toward essmtialism: the belief 
that the group has deep, relatively unchanging quali-
ties that give rise to their more surface-level charac-
teristics (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; 
Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004). When people 
think that a group is cntitative, they assume that the 
group members act as they d<1 because that ls simply 
the nature of people who are members of th.at 
particular group. 
The Significance of Groups 
Groups are scientifically, practically, and clinically 
significant. Groups-particularly groups with many, 
rather than few, of the defining feartires of groups, 
including relationships linking a substantial number 
of members, boundaries, interdependence, structure, 
cohesion, and entirativity-influcncc the thoughts, 
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emotions, and actipns of their members, so a scien-
tifically informed understanding of people requires 
understanding groups. Groups, as the final section 
of this chapter concludes, provide members with 
the resources they need to meet the demands they 
encounter in a wide range of environmental con-
texts across the span of their lives. 
Group1 and the Need to Belong 
Baum~istcr and Leary's (1995) belongingness 
hypothesis argues that "human beings have a perva-
sive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum 
quantity oflasting, positive, and impactful interper-
sonal relationships" (p. 497). Although groups with 
superficial relationships among members do not 
satisfy this need, members of long term, emotion~ 
aUy intensive groups--therapeutic groups, support 
groups, combat units, and high-demand religious 
organizations-display strong bonds between them-
selves and other group members-to the point of 
showing withdrawal when someone leaves the 
"family." A psychodynamic perspective suggests that 
groups provide a means of regaining the security of 
the family by creating emotional ties among mem-
bers by providing a sense of security like that of a 
nurturing parent and making possible relations with 
others that are similar in affective cono to sibling 
bonds (Freud, 1922; Lee & Robbins.1995). 
U>neliness 
Studies of people who are socially isolated attest to 
the distress caused by too few connections to others. 
Loneliness covaries with depression, anxiety, per-
sonality disorders, and interpersonal hostility; and 
prolonged periods of loneliness have been linked to 
such physical illnesses as cirrhosis of the liver, hyper-
tension, heart disease, and leukemia (Hojat & Vogel, 
1987; Jon~ & Carver, 1991). Individuals who 
are cxtremdy lonely display elevated levels of 
Epstein-Barr'Virus and reduced levels of B lympho-
cytes-characteristics that arc associated with reduc-
tions in immunity and increased vulnerability to 
mononucleosis (Kiecolt-Glaser, Speicher, Holliday, 
& Glaser, 1984). Loneliness is also linked to sui-
cidal thoughts and suicide attempts (Van Orden 
et al., 2010). 
Individuals who are members of social groups 
report less loneliness than individuals with few 
memberships. Weiss (1973) draws a distinction 
between social loneliness, which occurs when people 
lack ties to other people jn general, and emotional 
lonelin~the absence of a meaningful, intimate 
relationship with another person. Open, transitory 
groups do little to prevent either social or emotional 
loneliness; but dosed, highly engaging groups are 
sufficient to prevent social loneliness, and a group 
with many of the defining characteristics of a group 
(relationships, boundaries, interdependence, struc-
ture, cohesion, groupness) may mcccmembers emQ.· 
tional as well as social needs. People who belong to 
more groups and organizations report less loneliness 
than those who keep to themselves, and this effect is 
stronger for groups with many interconnections 
among members (Kraus, Davis, Bazzi.ni, Church, & 
Kirchman, 1993; Stokes, 1985) and highly cohesive 
ones (Anderson & Martin, 1995; Schmidt & 
Sermat, 1983). 
Isolation and Rejection 
Membership in a group promotes a range of positive 
social and psychological outcomes, but these benefits 
arc not as positive as the effects of exclusion are neg-
ative. Voluntary isolation apparently has few nega-
tive consequences, but unintended, involuntary 
isolarion is associated with emotional instability, 
insomrtia, memory lapses, depression, fatigue, and 
general confusion (Suedfcld, 1997). Deliberate social 
exclusion, or ostracism, has particularly negative 
consequences, in part since the isolation from groups 
it produces is intentional rather than accidentally 
produced. When Williams (2007) asked people who 
had peen ostracized to describe themselves, they 
used words such as "frustrated," "anxious," "nervous," 
and "lonely." They evidence physiological signs of 
stress, including elevated blood pre~ure and cortisol 
levels (a stress-related hormone), and brain-imaging 
research suggests that the pain of exclusion is ncuro-
logical1y similar to pain caused by physical injury 
(Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; 
MacDonald & Leary, 2005). 
Leary (1990) suggests that people are satisfied 
when a group takes them in but a group that actively 
seeks them out provides maximal inclusion. In con-
trast, individuals respond negatively when a group 
ignores or avoids them, but maximal exdusion-
the group rejects, ostracizes, abandons, or banishes--
is particularly punishing (Williams & Sommer, 
1997). He and his colleagues found an association 
between ostracism and acrs of violence, often aimed 
at those group members who were the rejectors 
(Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips. 2003). 
Exclusion also influences self-esteem. Leary's 
sociometer model, for example, suggests that sclf-
estecm is not based on private, personal appraisals 
of worth. Instead, Leary maintains that "self. 
esteem is part of a sociometer that monitors people's 
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relational value in other people's eyes,. (Leary, 2007, 
p . ..328). Self-esteem drops when exclusion is likely 
and is designed to motivate individuals to identify 
chc steps they should take to decrease the risk of 
social exclusion. In consequence, self-esteem rises 
~hen people fed included in groups and liked by 
others or when they think about a time when they 
were in a group that made chem feel they belonged 
(Srivastava & Beer, 2005). 
Group1 and Social Support 
When people find themselves in stressful, difficult 
circumstances, they often cope by forming or join-
ing a group (Dooley & Catalano, 1984). In many 
cases support is drawn from dyadic relationships, 
such as a single close personal friend or intimate 
partner, but in other instances the support stems 
from membership in an informally organized friend-
ship group or some other type of social aggregate. 
l:iays and Oxley (1986), for example, found that 
college students cope with the stresses of entering 
college by forming extensive social networks of 
peers, which evolve into friendship clusters. Stressful 
life. circumstances increase the risk of psychological 
and physical illness, but groups can serve as protec-
tiye -buffers against these negative consequences 
(.Herbert & Cohen, 1993: Uchino, Cacioppo, & 
Kiecolt..Glaser, 1996; Wills, 1991). This buffering 
effeGt argues that individuals who arc part of a group. 
may not be able to avoid stressful life events but 
they respond more positively when these stressors 
befall them. 
It should be noted, however, that the bulk of the 
research has focused on the effects of support from 
friends .and loved ones rather than groups per se. 
Heh~, until recently, it has not been possible to dis-
tinguish betWCen support drawn from close relation-
ships, such as dyadic relationships or a family 
meJllbcr, and support drawn from friendship cliques, 
oc:tworks of acquaintances, or social groups such as 
dubs, sports teams, church groups, work units, or 
sc;lf-help associations. Overall, however, the evidence 
suggests that people who belong to groups are 
ht'althier than individuals who have few ties to other 
p.cople (Strocbc, Stroebc, Abakoumkin, & . Schut, 
1996). Work by Stroebe and Stroebc (1996) and 
Sugisawa, Llahg. and Llu (1994) even suggests that 
group members have longer lives. 
Attitude1 and Values 
Cooley (1909) drew a broad d,istinction between 
two types of groups: primary groups and secondary 
groups (or complex groups). Primary groups arc 
small, close-knit groups, such as families, friendship 
cliques, or neighbors. Stcondary groups arc larger 
and more formally organized than primary groups. 
Such groups-religious congregations, work groups, 
clubs, neighborhood associations, and the like--
tend to be shorter in duration and less emotionally 
involving. Both of these types of groups provide 
members with their attitudes, values, and identities. 
Cooley maintained that groups teach members the 
skills they need to contribute to the group, provide 
chem with the opportunity to discover and internal-
ize the rules that govern social behavior, and let 
them practice modifying cheir behavior in response 
to social norms and others' Tequirements. Groups 
sodalire individual members (Parsons, Bales, & 
Shils, 1953). 
In most cases, when conflicts over opmions, 
choice.s, and lifestyle occur, they can. be traced back 
to the socializing effects of groups. Norms in gan~ 
cncourag~ members to take aggressive actions against 
ochers. Adolescent peer cliques pressure members to 
take drugs and commit illegal acts. Fraternities insist 
chat members engage in unhealthy practices, such as 
drinking excessive amounts of alcohol. Work groups 
develop such high standards for producth<lty that 
members experience unrelieved amounts of stress. 
Sororities may convince members to adopt habits 
with regard to dieting and exercise that trigger buli· 
mia (Crandall, 1988). Some groups can adopt even 
more unusual standards, and members may ·come to 
accept them. Radical religious groups, fot example. 
may be based on beliefs that nonmembers consider 
extraordinary but that members accept without 
question. 
Th~e emergent group norms are sustained by a 
common set of group-level informational, norma-
tive, and interpersonal processes (Fotsyth, 1990). 
Informational in6uencc occurs when the group 
provides members with information that they can 
use to make decisions and form opinions. People 
who join a group whose members accept bizarre 
ideas as true will, in time, explain things 
in that way as wdL Normative influence occurs 
when individuals tailor their actions to fit the 
group's norms. Many people take such norms as 
"Bribery is wrong" and "Contribute your time and 
resources to the community" for granted, but some 
societies and some groups have different norms 
which are equally powerful and widely accepted. 
Normative influence accounts for die transmission 
of religious, economic, moral, political, and lnter-
personal attitudes, beliefs, and values across genera-
tions. Interpersonal influence is used in those rare 
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instances when someone violates the group's norms. 
The individual who publicly violates a group's norm 
will likely meet with reproach or even be ostracized 
from the group. These three factors-informa-
tional, normative, and interpersonal influence-
can be readily observed in groups as diverse as 
military units, street gangs, college fraternities, and 
religious denominations. 
Identity 
The sclfis often viewed as an aspect of personality-
the outgrowth of ptivate personal experiences and 
self-reflection. But the self is also shaped, in part, by 
group-level processes. Just as Freud (1922) believed 
that identification causes children to bond with and 
imitate their parents, identification with the group 
prompts members to bond with, and take on the 
characteristics of, their groups. The psychological 
experience of group membership is a central prem-
ise in social identify theory of groups and intergroup 
relations. Tajfel and Turner (1986) and their col-
leagues originally developed social identity theory 
in their studies of intergroup conflict. In their stud-
ies they created what they thought were the most 
minimal of groups, for their groups were temporary 
~emblies of completely unrelated people with no 
history, no future, and no real connection to one 
another. Yet, they discovered, even in these minimal 
conditions, that group members began to identify 
with their groups, even to the point of favoring their 
group and its members over other groups. The 
groups became, very quickly, psychologically real 
for members. 
Social identity theory suggests the group 
becomes represented in each individual member, 
so their selves share some qualities in common 
(Turner er al., 1987). Brewer and her colleagues 
further divide the group-level side of the self into 
two components: the relational self and the collec-
tive self (Brewer, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Brewer & Chen, 2007). The relationa/ulfis defined 
by ties to ·other people, particularly dyadic and 
reciprocal roles such as father-son and leader-
follower, whereas the collective se/fis determined by 
membership in larger groups and categories if 
individuals consider these groups important and 
relevant to their self-concept. Individuals may. for 
example, come to de.fine themselves as employees 
of the place where they work, as dedicated follow-
ers of a particular religious group, or as patriotic 
citizens of their nation. 
People who identify with their groups experience 
a strong sense of belonging in their groups and take 
pride in their membership. 'They are more involved 
in the group'S activities and willingly help the group 
meet its goals (Abrams, Hogg. Hinkle, & Often, 
2005). But with the increased identification with 
the group comes the tendency to engage in self-ste-
reotyping: the integration of stereotypes pertaining 
to the group in one's own self-descriptions (Biernat, 
Vescio, & Green, 1996). Social identity is also con-
nected to feelings of self-worth. People who belong 
to prestigious groups tend to have higher self·esteem 
than those who belong to stigmatized groups 
(Brown & Lohr, 1987). However, as Crocker and 
Major (1989) noted in their seminal analysis of 
stigma, even membership in a socially denigrated 
group can sustain self-esteem. In many cases mem-
bers of stigmatized groups and minority groups pro-
tect their personal appraisals of their groups from 
unfair negative stereotypes by rejecting the dispar-
aging clements of their group's label. So long as 
individuals believe the groups they belong to are 
valuable, they will experience a heightened sense of 
personal self-esteem. 
The identity-sustaining aspects of group mem-
berships have a downside however. Membership in 
a group or social category may provide a social 
identity, but it can set in motion the tendency to 
derogate members of other groups. Group-based 
identities sow the seeds of conflict by creating a 
cognitive distinction between "us" and "them."' 
According to Tajfel and Turner (1986, p. 13). the 
"mere perception of belonging to two distinct 
groups--that is, social categorization per se--is 
sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favor-
ing the in group." Groups thus sustain individual 
members' self-esteem but at the cost of creating ctni· 
mosity toward those who belong to other groups. 
Goal Attainment 
Groups, in addition to yielding substantial psycho-
logical benefits for members, are the means by 
which most of the world's work is accomplished. 
Although the accomplishments oflone explorers are 
often highlighted by historians-Columbus, Marco 
Polo, Sir Edumund Hillary-these individuals were 
supported in their efforts by groups. Most inven .. 
tions are not developed by single individuals work-
ing in isolation but by teams of collaborators. In 
some cases even great artis~such as the impres-
sionists and da Vinci-produced their works as 
members of groups. A hundred years ago single 
craftspeople created commodities which were then 
sold to others, but in modern times most things 
are built by groups. Groups also make nearly all 
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decisions-at lease ones dealing with comploc or 
consequential matters. 
McGrath (1984) uses two dimensions (generate/ 
negotiate and choose/execute) to generate an eight-
category typology of group goals. Generating groups 
concoct strategies to be used to accomplish their 
goals (planning tasks) or to create altogether new 
ideas and approaches to problems (creativity tasks). 
Choosing groups make decisions about issues that 
have correct solutions (intelkctivt tasks) or answer 
tomplex questions that defy simple solution (deci-
sion~making tasks). Negotiating groups must resolve 
differences of opinion among members regarding 
their goals or decisions (cognitive conflict tasks) or 
resolve competitive disputes among members (mixe~ 
motive tasks). Executing groups do things, including 
competing against other groups (contest:slbattks!com-
pe-titiw tasks) or working together to create some 
product or carry out actions that require coordinated 
effort (performanceslpsychomotor ta!ks). McGrath's 
model thus distinguishes between conceprual-
behavioral goals and purely collaborative goals-
they require that group members work together to 
accomplish their goals-versus those that pit indi· 
viduals and/or groups against each other. 
Adopting the Group-level Perspective: 
Future Directions 
Twentieth-century theorists, researchers, and practi-
tioners made great strides in their quest to under-
stand human behavior. They maintained· that 
individuals arc psychologically complex, that that 
their inner mental life can be described and exam-
ined systematically, and that issues of psychological 
adjustment and dysfunction arc determined, in 
large part, by such psychological states and processes 
as needs, motivations, thoughts, personality, and 
perceptions. As Baars (1986, p. 412) concluded, 
':psychodynamic thought, broadly conceived, has 
probably provided the richest and most humanly 
rClevant vein of psychological theorizing in the cen-
tury." What is the next step that will be taken in the 
an;uysis of the human condition? 
What Level of Atudysuf 
A multilevel approach recommends augmenting the 
individual-level perspective wirh other perspeetlves, 
including one that focuses squarely on groups and 
group processes. At the level of the individual, peo-
ple's actions, thoughts, and emotions cannot be 
understood without taking into consideration the 
groups they bdong to and the groups that surround 
them. Culturally, all kinds of societies-hunting/ 
gathering, horticultural, pastoral, industrial, and 
postindustrial-are defined by the characteristics of 
the small groups chat compose them. On a practical 
level, much of the world's work is done by groups, 
so enhanced understanding of their dynamics may 
mean they can be designed to be ~fficient. To 
improve productivity in a factory, problem solving 
in a boardroom, or learning in the classroom, one 
must understand groups. 
What Discipline Will Take Responsibility 
for the Study of Groups? 
A multUevcl approach requires chat researchers share 
the study of groups with researchers in a variety of 
scientific disciplines and professions. Groups are 
and will contimre to be studied in psychology, sod· 
ology, communication studies, business, political 
science, economics, and anthropology; but in many 
cases researchers in these fields are not mindful of 
one another's work. By tradition, researchers tend to 
publish their finding8 in their own discipline's jour-
nals and to present their findings at conferences 
with colleagues from their own fields but only rarely 
explore connections between their work and the 
work being done in other disciplines. Since no one 
discipline can claim the study of groups as its right-
ful domain, future investigators should strive. to 
adopt a multidisciplinary, as well as a multilevel, 
perspective on groups, and changes in communica-
tion across fields should facilitate that process. 
W'Jl Groups Continue to Be Influential! 
Political scientist Robert Putnam (2000) wrote, in 
his whimsically citied book Bowling Alont, about the 
declining frequency of traditional groups. His anal-
yses suggested chat, since the 1960s1 the number of 
groups and people's involvement in groups have 
steadily declined. He did not fully consider, how-
ever, changes in the nature of groups chat have 
occurred recently. Interest in some types of groups--
community groups, fraternal and professional 
organizations, or even church-based groups-has 
decreased, but other types of groups-book groups, 
support groups, teams at work, and so on-have 
taken their place. In fact, even though Putnam's 
book title suggests chat people arc bowling alone 
rather than in groups, bowling remains a popular 
social activity, for hardly anyone bowls alone. They 
now bowl with friends, coworkers, and family mem-
bers. Given that the desire to join groups is likely 
woven into humans' genetic makeup, it is likely that 
groups-in one form or another-will continue to 
play a cencral role in human existence. 
FORSYTH 3 I 
Will Group-Level Approaches Gain 
Mommtumf 
In 1950 Slavson predicted thar group therapy would 
largely replace individual merhods of rreatment. In 
1954 Bogardus predicted that researchers would 
soon develop extensive measures of group personal-
ity and that groupality would become as important 
a concept in group psychology as personality is in 
individual psychology. In 1974 Steiner predicted 
that the 1980s would see groups emerge as the cen-
terpiece of social psychology. 
These predictions have not been fully confirmed. 
Group approaches have proven themselves to be 
effective, but they arc nor the preferred mode of 
treatment for most therapists and clients (Durkin, 
1999). Concepts like groupality. and synrality have 
failed to generate theoretical unity or empirical 
interest. The surge ofinrerest in groups predicted by 
Steiner did not occur, for groups arc understudied 
relative to such topics as personality, social cogni-
tion, attitudes, and relationships (Wittcnbaum & 
Moreland, 2008). 
What does the future hold for the group.Jevcl 
approaches to understanding human adjustment 
and well-being? . Although the course of science, 
because of its stress on discovery and innovation, 
is difficult to predict,. the contents of this volume 
suggest that group-level approaches are garnering 
increased interest among theorists, researchers, and 
practitioners. Past theoretical, empirical, and applied 
work has built a swrdy foundation for the continued 
development of the study of groups. Interest in 
meso- and macro-level pro«S.Ses has inaeased 
steadily in recent years, suggesting that a purely indi-
vidualistic orientation is giving way to a multilevel 
orientation. Therapeutic applications that utilii.c a 
group setting are becoming increasingly common, 
and empirical Studies of their utility have docu~ 
mcnted their therapeutic effectiveness (Burlingame, 
MacKenzie, & Strauss, 2004). As theorists, research· 
ers, and practitioners confirm the central importance 
of groups in people's lives, people will in time begin 
to think of themselves as group members first and 
individuals second (Forsyth, 2000). 
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